macroresilience

resilience, not stability

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Minsky and Hayek: Connections

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As Tyler Cowen argues, there are many similarities between Hayek’s and Minsky’s views on business cycles. Fundamentally, they both describe the “fundamental impossibility in maintaining orderly credit relations over time”.

Minsky saw Keynes’ theory as an ‘investment theory of the business cycle’ and his contribution as being a ‘financial theory of investment’. This financial theory was based on the credit/financing-focused endogenous theory of money of Joseph Schumpeter, whom Minsky studied under. Schumpeter’s views are best described in Chapter 3 (’Credit and Capital’) of his book ‘Theory of Economic Development’. The gist of this view is that “investment, and expenditures more generally, require financing, not saving” (Borio and Disyatat).

Schumpeter viewed the ability of banks to create money ex nihilo as the differentia specifica of capitalism. He saw bankers as ‘capitalists par excellence’ and viewed this ‘elastic’ nature of credit as an unambiguously positive phenomenon. Many people see Schumpeter’s view of money and banking as the antithesis of the Austrian view. But as Agnes Festre has highlighted, Hayek had a very similar view on the empirical reality of the credit process. Hayek however saw this elasticity of the monetary supply as a negative phenomenon. The similarity between Hayek and Minksy comes from the fact that Minsky also focused on the downside of an elastic monetary system in which overextension of credit was inevitably brought back to a halt by the violent snapback of the Minsky Moment.

Where Hayek and Minsky differed was that Minsky favoured a comprehensive stabilisation of the financial and monetary system through fiscal and monetary intervention after the Minsky moment. Hayek only supported the prevention of secondary deflationary spirals. Minsky supported aggressive and early monetary interventions (e.g. lender-of-last-resort programs) as well as fiscal stimulus. However, although Minsky supported stabilisation he was well aware of the damaging long-run consequences of stabilising the economic system. He understood that such a system would inevitably deteriorate into crony capitalism if fundamental reforms did not follow the stabilisation. Minsky supported a “policy strategy that emphasizes high consumption, constraints upon income inequality, and limitations upon permissible liability structures”. He also advocated “an industrial-organization strategy that limits the power of institutionalized giant firms”. Minsky was under no illusions that a stabilised capitalist economy could carry on with business as usual.

I disagree with Minsky on two fundamental points – I believe that a capitalist economy with sufficient low-level instability is resilient. Allow small failures of banks and financial players, tolerate small recessions and we can dramatically reduce the impact and probability of large-scale catastrophic recessions such as the 2008 financial crisis. A little bit of chaos is an essential ingredient in a resilient capitalist economy. I also believe that we must avoid stamping out the disturbance at its source and instead focus our efforts on mitigating the wider impact of the disturbance on the masses. In other words, bail out the masses with helicopter drops rather than bailing out the banks.

But although I disagree with Minsky his ideas are coherent. The same cannot be said for the current popular interpretation of Minsky which believes that so long as we deal with sufficient force when the Minsky moment arrives, capitalism can carry on as usual. As Minsky has argued in his book ‘John Maynard Keynes’, and as I have argued based on experiences in stabilising other complex adaptive systems such as rivers, forest fires and our brain, stabilised capitalism is an oxymoron.

What about Hayek’s views on credit elasticity? As I argued in an earlier post, “we live in a world where maturity transformation is no longer required to meet our investment needs. The evolution and malformation of the financial system means that Hayek’s analysis is more relevant now than it probably was during his own lifetime”. An elastic credit system is no longer beneficial to economic growth in the modern economy. This does not mean that we should ban the process of endogenous credit creation – it simply means that we must allow the maturity-transforming entities to collapse when they get in trouble1.


  1. Because we do not need an elastic, maturity-transforming financial system, we can firewall basic deposit banking from risky finance. This will enable us to allow the banks to fail when the next crisis hits us. The solution is not to ban casino banking but to suck the lifeblood out of it by constructing an alternative 100% reserve-like system. I have advocated that each resident should be given a deposit account with the central bank which can be backed by Treasuries, a ‘public option’ for basic deposit banking. John Cochrane has also argued for a similar system. In his words, “the Federal Reserve should continue to provide abundant reserves to banks, paying market interest. The Treasury could offer reserves to the rest of us—floating-rate, fixed-value, electronically-transferable debt. There is no reason that the Fed and Treasury should artificially starve the economy of completely safe, interest-paying cash”. ↩

Written by Ashwin Parameswaran

August 23rd, 2013 at 4:56 pm

Raghuram Rajan on Monetary Policy and Macroeconomic Resilience

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Amongst economic commentators, Raghuram Rajan has stood out recently for his consistent calls to raise interest rates from “ultra-low to the merely low”. Predictably, this suggestion has been met with outright condemnation by many economists, both of Keynesian and monetarist persuasion. Rajan’s case against ultra-low rates utilises many arguments but this post will focus on just one of these arguments that is straight out of the “resilience” playbook. In 2008, Raghu Rajan and Doug Diamond co-authored a paper, the conclusion of which Rajan summarises in his FT article: “the pattern of Fed policy over time builds expectations. The market now thinks that whenever the financial sector’s actions result in unemployment, the Fed will respond with ultra-low rates and easy liquidity. So even as the Fed has maintained credibility as an inflation fighter, it has lost credibility in fighting financial adventurism. This cannot augur well for the future.”

Much like he accused the Austrians, Paul Krugman accuses Rajan of being a “liquidationist”. This is not a coincidence – Rajan and Diamond’s thesis is quite explicit about its connections to Austrian Business Cycle Theory: “a central bank that promises to cut interest rates conditional on stress, or that is biased towards low interest rates favouring entrepreneurs, will induce banks to promise higher payouts or take more illiquid projects. This in turn can make the illiquidity crisis more severe and require a greater degree of intervention, a view reminiscent of the Austrian theory of cycles.” But as the summary hints, Rajan and Diamond’s thesis is fundamentally different from ABCT. The conventional Austrian story identifies excessive credit inflation and interest rates below the “natural” rate of interest as the driver of the boom/bust cycle but Rajan and Diamond’s thesis identifies the anticipation by economic agents of low rates and “liquidity” facilities every time there is an economic downturn as the driver of systemic fragility. The adaptation of banks and other market players to this regime makes the eventual bust all the more likely. As Rajan and Diamond note: “If the authorities are expected to reduce interest rates when liquidity is at a premium, banks will take on more short-term leverage or illiquid loans, thus bringing about the very states where intervention is needed.”

Rajan and Diamond’s thesis is limited to the impact of such policies on banks but as I noted in a previous post, market players also adapt to this implicit commitment from the central bank to follow easy money policies at the first hint of economic trouble. This thesis is essentially a story of the Greenspan-Bernanke era and the damage that the Greenspan Put has caused. It also explains the dramatically diminishing returns inherent in the Greenspan Put strategy as the stabilising policies of the central bank become entrenched in the expectations of market players and crucially banks – in each subsequent cycle, the central bank has to do more and more (lower rates, larger liquidity facilities) to achieve less and less.

Written by Ashwin Parameswaran

August 3rd, 2010 at 6:30 am

Maturity Transformation and the Yield Curve

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Maturity Transformation (MT) enables all firms, not just banks to borrow short-term money to invest in long-term projects. Of course, banks are the most effective maturity transformers, enabled by deposit insurance/TBTF protection which discourages their creditors from demanding their money back all at the same time and a liquidity backstop from a fiat currency-issuing central bank if panic sets in despite the guarantee. Given the above definition, it is obvious that the presence of MT results in a flatter yield curve than would be the case otherwise (Mencius Moldbug explains it well and this insight is implicit as well in Austrian Business Cycle Theory). This post tries to delineate the exact mechanisms via which the yield curve flattens and how the impact of MT has evolved over the last half-century, particularly due to changes in banks’ asset-liability management (ALM) practices.

Let’s take a simple example of a bank that funds via demand deposits and lends these funds out in the form of 30-year fixed-rate mortgages. This loan if left unhedged exposes the bank to three risks: Liquidity Risk, Interest Rate Risk and Credit Risk. The liquidity risk is of course essentially unhedgeable – it can and is mitigated by for example, converting the mortgage into a securitised form that can be sold onto other banks. But the gap inherent in borrowing short and lending long is unhedgeable. The credit risk of the loan can be hedged but often is not, as compensation for taking on credit risk is one of the fundamental functions of a bank. However, the interest rate risk can be and often is hedged out in the interest rate swaps market.

Interest Rate Risk Management in Bank ALM

Prior to the advent of interest rate derivatives as hedging tools, banks had limited avenues to hedge out interest rate risk. As a result, most banks suffered significant losses whenever interest rates rose. For example, after World War II, US banks were predominantly invested in fixed rate government bonds they had bought during the war. Martin Mayer’s excellent book on ‘The Fed’ documents a Chase banker who said to him in reaction to a Fed rate hike in 1952 that “he never thought he would live to see the day when the government would deliberately make the banking system technically insolvent.” The situation had not changed much even by the 1980s – the initial trigger that set off the S&L crisis was the dramatic rise in interest rates in 1981 that rendered the industry insolvent.

By the 1990s however, many banks had started hedging their duration gap with the aim of mitigating the damage that a sudden move in interest rates could do to their balance sheets. One of the earlier examples is the case of Banc One and the HBS case study on the bank’s ALM strategy is a great introduction to the essence of interest rate hedging. More recently, the Net Interest Income (NII) sensitivity of Bank of America according to slide 35 in this investor presentation is exactly the opposite of the typical maturity-transforming unhedged bank – the bank makes money when rates go up or when the curve steepens. But more importantly, the sensitivity is negligible compared to the size of the bank which suggests a largely duration-matched position.

In the above analysis, I am not suggesting that the banking system does not play the interest carry trade at all. The FDIC’s decision to release an interest rate risk advisory in January certainly suggests that some banks are. I am only suggesting that if a bank does play the carry trade, it is because it chooses to do so and not because it is forced to do so by the nature of its asset-liability profile. Moreover, the indications are that many of the larger banks are reasonably insensitive to changes in interest rates and currently choose not to play the carry game ( See also Wells Fargo’s interest rate neutral stance ).

What does this mean for the impact of MT on the yield curve? It means that the role of the interest rate carry trade inherent in MT in flattening the yield curve is an indeterminate one. At the very least, it has a much smaller role than one would suspect. Taking the earlier example of the bank invested in a 30-year fixed rate mortgage, the bank would simply enter into a 30-year interest rate swap where it pays a fixed rate and receives a floating rate to hedge away its interest rate risk. There are many possible counterparties who want to receive fixed rates in long durations – two obvious examples are corporates who want to hedge their fixed rate issuance back into floating and pension funds and life insurers who need to invest in long-tenor instruments to match their liabilities.

So if interest rate carry is not the source of the curve flattening caused by MT, what is? The answer lies in the other unhedged risk – credit risk. Credit risk curves are also usually upward sloping (except when the credit is distressed) and banks take advantage by funding themselves at a very short tenor where credit spreads are low and lending at long tenors where spreads are much higher. This strategy of course exposes them to the risk of credit risk repricing on their liabilities and this was exactly the problem that banks and corporate maturity transformers such as GE faced during the crisis. Credit was still available but the spreads had widened so much that refinancing at those spreads alone would cause insolvency. This is not dissimilar to the problem that Greece faces at present.

The real benefit of the central bank’s liquidity backstop is realised in this situation. When interbank repo markets and commercial paper markets lock up as they did during the crisis, banks and influential corporates like GE can always repo their assets with the central bank on terms not available to any other private player. The ECB’s 12-month repo program is probably the best example of such a quasi-fiscal liquidity backstop.

Conclusion

Given my view that the interest rate carry trade is a limited phenomenon, I do not believe that the sudden removal of MT will produce a “smoking heap of rubble” (Mencius Moldbug’s view). The yield curve will steepen to the extent that the credit carry trade vanishes but even this will be limited by increased demand from long-term investors, most notably pension funds. The conventional story that MT is the only way to fund long-term projects ignores the increasing importance of pension funds and life insurers who have natural long-tenor liabilities that need to be matched against long-tenor assets.

Written by Ashwin Parameswaran

April 4th, 2010 at 5:54 am