macroresilience

resilience, not stability

Archive for June, 2012

Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policy and Inflation

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In a previous post I argued that in the current environment, the Federal Reserve could buy up the entire stock of government bonds without triggering any incremental inflation. The argument for the ineffectiveness of conventional QE is fairly simple. Government bonds are already safe collateral both in the shadow banking system as well as with the central bank itself. The liquidity preference argument is redundant in differentiating between deposits and an asset that qualifies as safe collateral. Broad money supply is therefore unaffected when such an asset is purchased.

The monetarist objection to this argument is that QE increases the stock of high-powered money and increases the price level to the extent that this increase is perceived as permanent. But in an environment where interest is paid on reserves or deposits with the central bank, the very concept of high-powered money is meaningless and there is no hot potato effect to speak of. Some monetarists argue that we need to enforce a penalty rate on reserves to get rid of excess reserves but small negative rates make little difference to safe-haven flows and large negative rates will lead to people hoarding bank notes.

The other objection is as follows: if the central bank can buy up all the debt then why don’t we do just that and retire all that debt and make the state debt-free? Surely that can’t be right – isn’t such debt monetisation the road to Zimbabwe-like hyperinflation? Intuitively, many commentators interpret QE as a step on the slippery slope of fiscal deficit monetisation but this line of thought is fatally flawed. Inflation comes about from the expected and current monetisation of fiscal deficits, not from the central bank’s purchase of the stock of government debt that has arisen from past fiscal deficits. The persistent high inflation that many emerging market economies are so used to arises from money-printed deficits that are expected to continue well into the future.

So why do the present and future expected fiscal deficits in the US economy not trigger inflation today? One, the present deficits come at a time when the shadow money supply is still contracting. And two, the impact of expected future deficits in the future is muddied thanks to the status of the US Dollar as the reserve currency of the world, a status that has been embellished since the 90s thanks to reserves being used as capital flight and IMF-avoidance insurance by many EM countries (This post by Brett Fiebiger is an excellent explanation of the privileged status enjoyed by the US Dollar). The expectations channel has to deal with too much uncertainty and there are too many scenarios in which the USD may hold its value despite large deficits, especially if the global economy continues to be depressed and demand for safe assets remains elevated. There are no such uncertainties in the case of peripheral economy fiat currencies (e.g. Hungary). To the extent that there is any safe asset demand, it is mostly local and the fact that other global safe assets exist means that the fiscal leeway that peripheral economies possess is limited. In other words, the absence of inflation is not just a matter of the market trusting the US government to take care of its long-term structural deficit problems – uncertainty and the “safe asset” status of the USD greatly diminish the efficacy of the expectations channel.

Amidst the fog of uncertainty and imperfect commitments, concrete steps matter and they matter especially in the midst of a financial crisis. Monetary policy can almost always prevent deflation in the face of a contraction in shadow money supply via the central banks’ lender-of-last-resort facilities. In an economy like 2008-2009, no amount of open-market operations, asset purchases and monetary target commitments can prevent a sharp deflationary contraction in the private shadow money supply unless the lender-of-last-resort facility is utilised. Once the system is stabilised and the possibility of a deflationary contraction has been avoided, monetary policy has very little leeway to create incremental inflation in the absence of fiscal profligacy and shadow banking/private credit expansion except via essentially fiscal actions such as buying private assets, credit guarantees etc. In the present situation where the private household economy is excessively indebted and the private business economy suffers from a savings glut and a persistent investment deficit due to structural malformation, fiscal profligacy is the only short-term option. Correspondingly, no amount of monetary stimulus can prevent a sharp fiscal contraction from causing deflation in the current economic state.

Monetary policy is also not all-powerful in its contractionary role – it has significant but not unlimited leeway to tighten policy in the face of fiscal profligacy or shadow banking expansion. The Indian economy in 1995-1996 illustrates how the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) could control inflation in the face of fiscal profligacy only by crippling the private sector economy. The real rates faced by the private sector shot up and spending ground to a halt. The dilemma faced by the RBI today mirror the problems it faced then – if fiscal indiscipline by the Indian government persists, the RBI cannot possibly bring down inflation to acceptable levels without causing the private sector economy to keel over.

The current privileged status of the US Dollar and the low interest rates and inflation does not imply that long-term fiscal discipline is unimportant. Currently, the demand for safety reduces inflation and the low inflation renders the asset safer – this virtuous positive-feedback cycle can turn vicious if expectation of monetisation is sufficiently large and the mutual-feedback nature of the process means that any such transition will almost certainly be rapid. It is not even clear that the United States is better off than say Hungary in the long run. The United States has much leeway and flexibility than Hungary but if it abuses this privilege, any eventual break will be that much more violent. Borrowing from an old adage, give an economy too much rope and it will hang itself.

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Written by Ashwin Parameswaran

June 20th, 2012 at 4:55 pm

SNB’s Swiss Franc Dilemma: A Solution

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As I highlighted in my previous post, the honeymoon period for the SNB in its enforcement of the 1.20 floor on the EURCHF exchange rate is well and truly over. In May, the SNB needed to intervene to the tune of CHF 66 bn to defend the floor. There’s even speculation that the SNB may be forced to implement capital controls or negative interest rates on offshore deposits in the event of a disorderly Greek exit from the Eurozone.

Increasingly, the SNB is caught between a rock and a hard place. Either it can continue to defend the peg and accumulate increasing amounts of foreign exchange reserves on which it faces the prospect of correspondingly increasing losses. Or it can abandon the peg, allow the CHF to appreciate 20-25% and risk deflation and a collapse in exports and GDP. It is not difficult to see why the SNB is being forced to defend the peg – the EUR in the current environment is a risky asset and the CHF is a safe asset. By committing to sell a safe asset at a below-market price, the SNB is subsidising the price of safety. It is no wonder then that this offer finds so many takers when there is a flight to safety.

Some argue that the continued deflation in the Swiss economy allows the SNB to maintain its peg but this argument ignores the fact that it is the continued deflation that also maintains the safe status of the Swiss Franc. Deflation provides the impetus for the safe-haven flows due to which the required intervention by the SNB and the SNB’s risk exposure are that much greater in magnitude. Therefore, if the SNB is eventually forced to abandon the floor, the earlier the better. A prolonged period of deflation punctuated by occasional flights to safety will compel the SNB to accumulate an unsustainable level of foreign exchange reserves to defend the floor. By the same logic, the SNB would obviously prefer that the Eurozone not implode but if it does implode, then it would rather that the Euro implodes sooner rather than later.

So what does the SNB need to do? It needs to engineer an outcome where the market price of the EURCHF moves up and the CHF devalues by itself. The only sustainable way to achieve this is to provide a significant dose of inflation to the Swiss economy and it needs to do so in a manner that does not provide an even larger subsidy to those running away from risk. For example, raising the EURCHF floor by itself only increases the temptation to buy the Franc and at best provides a one-time dose of inflation. The SNB could decide to buy CHF private sector assets but the safe-haven inflows and relatively strong performance of the Swiss economy mean that asset markets, especially housing, are already frothy.

The more sustainable and equitable solution is to simply make the safe asset unsafe by generating the requisite inflation for which money-financed helicopter drops are the best solution. Money-financed fiscal transfers will create inflation, deter the safe-haven inflow and shore up the balance sheet of the Swiss household sector. The robustness of this solution in creating sustainable inflation will not come as a shock to any emerging market central banker or finance minister. The crucial difference between this plan and that implemented by banana republics around the world is that instead of printing money and funnelling it to corrupt government officials we will distribute the money to the masses.

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Written by Ashwin Parameswaran

June 12th, 2012 at 11:21 am

Monetary Policy Targets and The Need for Market Intervention

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If we analyse monetary policy as a threat strategy, then how do we make sure that the threat is credible? According to Nick Rowe, “The Fed needs to communicate its target clearly. And it needs to threaten to do unlimited amounts of QE for an unlimited amount of time until its target is hit. If that threat is communicated clearly, and believed, the actual amount of QE needed will be negative.” In essence, this is a view that a credible threat will cause market expectations to adjust and negate the need for any actual intervention in markets by the central bank.

The current poster-child for this view is the SNB’s maintenance of a floor on the EURCHF exchange rate at 1.20. The market-expectations story argues that because the SNB has credibly committed to maintaining a floor on EURCHF, it will not need to intervene in the markets at all (See Evan Soltas here and here, Scott Sumner, Matthew Yglesias and Timothy Lee). And indeed the SNB did not need to intervene at all…..that is, until May, when they were required to intervene to the tune of CHF 66 billion within the span of just a month in order to defend the floor from euro-crisis induced safe-haven flows.

Even when the central bank wants to hit a target as transparent and as liquidly traded as an exchange rate, it seems that actual intervention is needed sooner or later. Therefore when the transmission channel between central bank purchase of assets and the target variable is as blurred as it would be in regimes such as NGDP targeting, it is unlikely that the central bank will get away with just waving the magic wand of market expectations.

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Written by Ashwin Parameswaran

June 7th, 2012 at 11:15 pm

Posted in Monetary Policy

The Case Against Monetary Stimulus Via Asset Purchases

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Many economists and commentators blame the Federal Reserve for the increasingly tepid economic recovery in the United States. For example, Ryan Avent calls the Fed’s unwillingness to further ease monetary policy a “dereliction of duty” and Felix Salmon claims that “we have low bond yields because the Fed has failed to do its job”. Most people assume that the adoption of a higher inflation target (or an NGDP target) and conventional quantitative easing (QE) via government bond purchases will suffice. Milton Friedman, for example, had argued that government bond purchases with “high-powered money” would have dragged Japan out of its recession. But how exactly is more QE supposed to work in an environment when treasury bonds are trading at all-time low yields and banks are awash in excess reserves?

If we analyse monetary policy as a threat strategy, then how do we make sure that the threat is credible? According to Nick Rowe, “The Fed needs to communicate its target clearly. And it needs to threaten to do unlimited amounts of QE for an unlimited amount of time until its target is hit. If that threat is communicated clearly, and believed, the actual amount of QE needed will be negative.” In essence, this is a view that market expectations are sufficient to do the job.

Expectations are a large component of how monetary policy works but expectations only work when there is a clear and credible set of actions that serve as the bazooka(s) to enforce these expectations. In other words, what is it exactly that the central bank threatens to do if the market refuses to react sufficiently to its changed targets? It is easy to identify the nature of the threat when the target variable is simply a market price, e.g. an exchange rate vs another currency (such as the SNB’s enforcement of a minimum EURCHF exchange rate) or an exchange rate vs a commodity (such as the abandoning of the gold standard). But when the target variable is not a market price, the transmission mechanism is nowhere near as simple.

Scott Sumner would implement an NGDP targeting regime in the following manner:

First create an explicit NGDP target. Use level targeting, which means you promise to make up for under- or overshooting. If excess reserves are a problem, get rid of most of them with a penalty rate. Commit to doing QE until various asset prices show (in the view of Fed officials) that NGDP is expected to hit the announced target one or two years out. If necessary buy up all of Planet Earth.

Interest on Reserves

Small negative rates on reserves or deposits held at the central bank are not unusual. But banks can and will pass on this cost to their deposit-holders in the form of negative deposit rates and given the absence of any better liquid and nominally safe investment options, most bank customers will pay this safety premium. For example, when the SNB charged negative rates on offshore deposits denominated in Swiss Franc in the mid-1970s, the move did very little to stem the inflow into the currency.

Significant negative rates are easily evaded as people possess the option to hold cash in the form of bank notes. As SNB Vice-Chairman Jean-Pierre Danthine notes:

With strongly negative interest rates, theory joins practice and seems to lead to a policy of holding onto bank notes (cash) rather than accounts, which destabilises the system.

Quantitative Easing: Government Bonds

Conventional QE can be deconstructed into two components: an exchange of money for treasury-bills and an exchange of treasury-bills for treasury-bonds. The first component has no impact on the market risk position of the T-bill holder for whom deposits and T-bills are synonymous in a zero-rates environment. But it is also irrelevant from the perspective of the banking system unless the rate paid on reserves is significantly negative (which can be evaded by holding bank notes as discussed above).

The second component obviously impacts the market risk position of the economy as a whole. It is widely assumed that by purchasing government bonds, the central bank reduces the duration risk exposure of the market as a whole thus freeing up risk capacity. But for most holders of government bonds (especially pension funds and insurers), duration is not a risk but a hedge. A nominal dollar receivable in 20 years is not always riskier than a nominal dollar receivable today – for those who hold the bond as a hedge for a liability of a nominal dollar payable in 20 years, the dollar receivable today is in fact the riskier holding. More generally the negative beta nature of government bonds means that the central bank increases the risk exposure of the economy when it buys them.

Apart from the market risk impact of QE, we need to examine whether it has any impact on the liquidity position of the private economy. In this respect, neither the first or the second step has any impact for a simple reason – the assets being bought i.e. govt bonds are already safe collateral both in the shadow banking system as well as with the central bank itself. Therefore, any owner of government bonds can freely borrow cash against it. The liquidity preference argument is redundant in differentiating between deposits and an asset that qualifies as safe collateral. Broad money supply is therefore unaffected when such an asset is purchased.

If conventional QE were the only tool in the arsenal, announcing higher targets or NGDP targets achieves very little. The Bank of England and the Federal Reserve could buy up the entire outstanding stock of govt bonds and the impact on inflation or economic growth would be negligible in the current environment.

Credit Easing and More: Private Sector Assets

Many proponents of NGDP targeting would assert that limiting the arsenal of the central bank to simply treasury bonds is inappropriate and that the central bank must be able to purchase private sector assets (bonds, equities) or as Scott Sumner exhorts above “If necessary buy up all of Planet Earth”. There is no denying the fact that by buying up all of Planet Earth, any central bank can create inflation. But when the assets bought are already liquid and market conditions are not distressed, buying of private assets creates inflation only by increasing the price and reducing the yield of those assets i.e. a wealth transfer from the central bank to the chosen asset-holders. As with quantitative easing through government bond purchases, the inability to enforce adequate penalties on reserves nullifies any potential “hot potato” effect.

Bernanke himself has noted that the liquidity facility interventions during the 2008-2009 crisis and QE1 were focused on reducing private market credit spreads and improving the functioning of private credit markets at a time when the market for many private sector assets was under significant stress and liquidity premiums were high. The current situation is not even remotely comparable – yields on private credit instruments are at relatively elevated levels compared to historical median spreads but the difference in absolute terms is only about 50 bps on investment-grade credit (see table below) as compared to much higher levels (at least 300-40 bps on investment grade) during the 2008-2009 crisis.

US Historical Credit Spreads
Source: Robeco

A quantitative easing program focused on purchasing private sector assets is essentially a fiscal program in monetary disguise and is not even remotely neutral in its impact on income distribution and economic activity. Even if the central bank buys a broad index of bonds or equities, such a program is by definition a transfer of wealth towards asset-holders and regressive in nature (financial assets are largely held by the rich). The very act of making private sector assets “safe” is a transfer of wealth from the taxpayer to some of the richest people in our society. The explicit nature of the central banks’ stabilisation commitment means that the rent extracted from the commitment increases over time as more and more economic actors align their portfolios to hold the stabilised and protected assets.

Such a program is also biased towards incumbent firms and against new firms. The assumption that an increase in the price of incumbent firms’ stock/bond price will flow through to lending and investment in new businesses is unjustified due to the significantly more uncertain nature of new business lending/investment. This trend has been exacerbated since the crisis and the bond market is increasingly biased towards the largest, most liquid issuers. Even more damaging, any long-term macroeconomic stabilisation program that commits to purchasing and supporting macro-risky assets will incentivise economic actors to take on macro risk and shed idiosyncratic risk. Idiosyncratic risk-taking is the lifeblood of innovation in any economy.

In other words, QE is not sufficient to hit any desired inflation/NGDP target unless it is expanded to include private sector assets. If it is expanded to include private sector assets, it will exacerbate the descent into an unequal, crony capitalist, financialised and innovatively stagnant economy that started during the Greenspan/Bernanke put era.

Removing the zero-bound

One way of getting around the zero-bound on interest rates is to simply abolish or tax bank note holdings as Willem Buiter has recommended many times:

The existence of bank notes or currency, which is an irredeemable ‘liability’ of the central bank – bearer bonds with a zero nominal interest rate – sets a lower bound (probably at something just below 0%) on central banks’ official policy rates.
The obvious solutions are: (1) abolishing currency completely and moving to E-money on which negative interest rates can be paid as easily as zero or positive rates; (2) taxing holdings of bank notes (a solution first proposed by Gesell (1916) and also advocated by Irving Fisher (1933)) or (3) ending the fixed exchange rate between currency and central bank reserves (which, like all deposits, can carry negative nominal interest rates as easily as positive nominal interest rates, a solution due to Eisler (1932)).

I’ve advocated many times on this blog that monetary-fiscal hybrid policies such as money-financed helicopter drops to individuals should be established as the primary tool of macroeconomic stabilisation. In this manner, inflation/NGDP targets can be achieved in a close-to-neutral manner that minimises rent extraction. My preference for fiscal-monetary helicopter drops over negative interest-rates is primarily driven by financial stability considerations. There is ample evidence that even low interest rates contribute to financial instability.

There’s a deep hypocrisy at the heart of the macro-stabilised era. Every policy of stabilisation is implemented in a manner that only a select few (typically corporate entities) can access with an implicit assumption that the impact will trickle-down to the rest of the economy. Central-banking since the Great Moderation has suffered from an unwarranted focus on asset prices driven by an implicit assumption that changes in asset prices are the best way to influence the macroeconomy. Instead doctrines such as the Greenspan Put have exacerbated inequality and cronyism and promoted asset price inflation over wage inflation. The single biggest misconception about the macro policy debate is the notion that monetary policy is neutral or more consistent with a free market and fiscal policy is somehow socialist and interventionist. A program of simple fiscal transfers to individuals can be more neutral than any monetary policy instrument and realigns macroeconomic stabilisation away from the classes and towards the masses.

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Written by Ashwin Parameswaran

June 4th, 2012 at 2:36 pm