Comments on: The “Crash of 2:45 p.m.” as a Consequence of System Fragility http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/05/16/the-crash-of-245-p-m-as-a-consequence-of-system-fragility/ towards a more resilient macroeconomy Sun, 05 Feb 2012 10:17:44 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: The Resilience Stability Tradeoff: Drawing Analogies between River Flood Management and Macroeconomic Management at Macroeconomic Resilience http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/05/16/the-crash-of-245-p-m-as-a-consequence-of-system-fragility/comment-page-1/#comment-7705 The Resilience Stability Tradeoff: Drawing Analogies between River Flood Management and Macroeconomic Management at Macroeconomic Resilience Mon, 18 Oct 2010 17:35:28 +0000 http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=441#comment-7705 [...] minor and frequently observed disturbances would trigger a catastrophic outcome. As Jon Stewart put it, even “regular storms” would topple a fragile boat. When faced with the possibility of [...] [...] minor and frequently observed disturbances would trigger a catastrophic outcome. As Jon Stewart put it, even “regular storms” would topple a fragile boat. When faced with the possibility of [...]

]]> By: Macroeconomic Resilience « Money, Credit & Financial Systems http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/05/16/the-crash-of-245-p-m-as-a-consequence-of-system-fragility/comment-page-1/#comment-2548 Macroeconomic Resilience « Money, Credit & Financial Systems Sat, 24 Jul 2010 08:01:17 +0000 http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=441#comment-2548 [...] Our anonymous author (let’s call him MR) applies this concept very nicely to markets: [...] [...] Our anonymous author (let’s call him MR) applies this concept very nicely to markets: [...]

]]> By: Blog Profile: Macroresilience « Financialfreezeframe's Blog http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/05/16/the-crash-of-245-p-m-as-a-consequence-of-system-fragility/comment-page-1/#comment-1510 Blog Profile: Macroresilience « Financialfreezeframe's Blog Sat, 05 Jun 2010 18:14:45 +0000 http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=441#comment-1510 [...] also places the flash crash into [...] [...] also places the flash crash into [...]

]]> By: The government cannot be responsible for systemic credit risk « Synthetic Assets http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/05/16/the-crash-of-245-p-m-as-a-consequence-of-system-fragility/comment-page-1/#comment-1350 The government cannot be responsible for systemic credit risk « Synthetic Assets Sat, 29 May 2010 01:06:27 +0000 http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=441#comment-1350 [...] which I can only say that I agree with the anonymous blogger at Macroeconomic Resilience that Jon Stewart has demonstrated a remarkably accurate diagnosis of our current problems: Why is [...] [...] which I can only say that I agree with the anonymous blogger at Macroeconomic Resilience that Jon Stewart has demonstrated a remarkably accurate diagnosis of our current problems: Why is [...]

]]> By: derek http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/05/16/the-crash-of-245-p-m-as-a-consequence-of-system-fragility/comment-page-1/#comment-1179 derek Tue, 18 May 2010 12:16:00 +0000 http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=441#comment-1179 well done, tough to beat a market-relevant article linking to Mauboussin, Taleb, and John Stewart! well done, tough to beat a market-relevant article linking to Mauboussin, Taleb, and John Stewart!

]]> By: Goatmug http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/05/16/the-crash-of-245-p-m-as-a-consequence-of-system-fragility/comment-page-1/#comment-1122 Goatmug Sun, 16 May 2010 19:18:47 +0000 http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=441#comment-1122 While the entire media circus centers around the crash, I am asking who was responsible for the resurgent buying spree? Every professional and day trader will admit that the 70% rebound in the market was "fake" and therefore a prudent trader has his finger on the sell button waiting for the collapse. I'm not sure how many traders had their finger on the buy button, or had a trade executed in their favor during those volatile 6 to 10 minutes. I would contend that the only people that got favorable executions were the very ones that instigated the tremendous decline. Finally, little has been noted that the legislation to audit the Fed and also bolster bank reforms were being discussed during the exact time of the market rout. If nothing, the experience left politicians keenly aware of what happens to the "economy" when you attempt to throttle the bankers. While the entire media circus centers around the crash, I am asking who was responsible for the resurgent buying spree? Every professional and day trader will admit that the 70% rebound in the market was “fake” and therefore a prudent trader has his finger on the sell button waiting for the collapse.

I’m not sure how many traders had their finger on the buy button, or had a trade executed in their favor during those volatile 6 to 10 minutes. I would contend that the only people that got favorable executions were the very ones that instigated the tremendous decline.

Finally, little has been noted that the legislation to audit the Fed and also bolster bank reforms were being discussed during the exact time of the market rout. If nothing, the experience left politicians keenly aware of what happens to the “economy” when you attempt to throttle the bankers.

]]> By: Sunday links: electronic incivility Abnormal Returns http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/05/16/the-crash-of-245-p-m-as-a-consequence-of-system-fragility/comment-page-1/#comment-1104 Sunday links: electronic incivility Abnormal Returns Sun, 16 May 2010 11:21:46 +0000 http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=441#comment-1104 [...] Five things we still don’t know about the flash crash.  (WashingtonPost also Macroeconomic Resilience) [...] [...] Five things we still don’t know about the flash crash.  (WashingtonPost also Macroeconomic Resilience) [...]

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