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	<title>Comments on: Natural Selection, Self-Deception  and the Moral Hazard Explanation of the Financial Crisis</title>
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	<link>http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/02/17/natural-selection-self-deception-and-moral-hazard/</link>
	<description>towards a more resilient macroeconomy</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 08 Sep 2010 09:28:33 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>By: admin</title>
		<link>http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/02/17/natural-selection-self-deception-and-moral-hazard/comment-page-1/#comment-1385</link>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 30 May 2010 14:00:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=231#comment-1385</guid>
		<description>Rafe - Thanks for the references.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rafe &#8211; Thanks for the references.</p>
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		<title>By: Rafe Furst</title>
		<link>http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/02/17/natural-selection-self-deception-and-moral-hazard/comment-page-1/#comment-1263</link>
		<dc:creator>Rafe Furst</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 22 May 2010 15:47:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=231#comment-1263</guid>
		<description>Good article.  

You might check out the work on Common Knowledge vs Mutual Knowledge as it helps explain these sorts of complex regimes.  

Also &quot;implicit collusion&quot; in poker tournaments.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good article.  </p>
<p>You might check out the work on Common Knowledge vs Mutual Knowledge as it helps explain these sorts of complex regimes.  </p>
<p>Also &#8220;implicit collusion&#8221; in poker tournaments.</p>
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		<title>By: Does Majoritarian Democracy Systematically Result in Moral Hazard and Financial Industry Irresponsibility? &#171; Let A Thousand Nations Bloom</title>
		<link>http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/02/17/natural-selection-self-deception-and-moral-hazard/comment-page-1/#comment-1224</link>
		<dc:creator>Does Majoritarian Democracy Systematically Result in Moral Hazard and Financial Industry Irresponsibility? &#171; Let A Thousand Nations Bloom</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 20 May 2010 15:50:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=231#comment-1224</guid>
		<description>[...] If our best economists knew in 1993, in a widely published article that bankruptcy for profit could occur when government guarantees a firm&#8217;s debt obligations, why is it that the U.S. government continue to guarantee debt obligations?  Indeed, not only it continued the guarantees, but it expanded them &#8211;  by means of numerous actions supported by both Democratic and Republican Congressmen expanded the scale of its debt obligations through the deliberate growth of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  And note that bankruptcy for profit is merely the most extreme case of moral hazard due to government guarantees; there are plenty of deep moral hazard issues due to government guarantees that could lead to similarly catastrophic outcomes well before we get to the case of outright looters.   (See both Roberts and Macroeconomic Resilience, a brilliant anonymous blogger he cites; see the analysis here,here, and here). [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] If our best economists knew in 1993, in a widely published article that bankruptcy for profit could occur when government guarantees a firm&#8217;s debt obligations, why is it that the U.S. government continue to guarantee debt obligations?  Indeed, not only it continued the guarantees, but it expanded them &#8211;  by means of numerous actions supported by both Democratic and Republican Congressmen expanded the scale of its debt obligations through the deliberate growth of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  And note that bankruptcy for profit is merely the most extreme case of moral hazard due to government guarantees; there are plenty of deep moral hazard issues due to government guarantees that could lead to similarly catastrophic outcomes well before we get to the case of outright looters.   (See both Roberts and Macroeconomic Resilience, a brilliant anonymous blogger he cites; see the analysis here,here, and here). [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Natural selection, self-deception and the moral hazard explanation of the crisis - Viewsflow</title>
		<link>http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/02/17/natural-selection-self-deception-and-moral-hazard/comment-page-1/#comment-315</link>
		<dc:creator>Natural selection, self-deception and the moral hazard explanation of the crisis - Viewsflow</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Feb 2010 18:41:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=231#comment-315</guid>
		<description>[...] Bankers didn&#039;t need to consciously envision a bailout to be subject to moral hazard: bankers just needed to deceive themselves about the risks they were taking.Close [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Bankers didn&#39;t need to consciously envision a bailout to be subject to moral hazard: bankers just needed to deceive themselves about the risks they were taking.Close [...]</p>
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		<title>By: admin</title>
		<link>http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/02/17/natural-selection-self-deception-and-moral-hazard/comment-page-1/#comment-288</link>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 20 Feb 2010 04:54:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=231#comment-288</guid>
		<description>Student - in fairness to Trivers, I linked to his collection of papers in which he collated all his work organised by theme. I&#039;m sure he has made his point more briefly in earlier works!

You&#039;re right. I thought of mentioning Ramachandran&#039;s critique of Trivers but decided against it because I wasn&#039;t leaning on a strict interpretation of Trivers&#039; conclusion. As Ramachandran mentions, self-deception has maladaptive consequences. But its not clear to me that the true believer banker is engaging in true self-deception given that he benefits in the short run. As I see it, the conclusion is more relevant for the knowing deceiver who has an uphill task competing with a true believer. 

But yes - I think Ramachandran&#039;s paper especially is fascinating reading and very well-written and accessible. 

On Kuhn again you&#039;re right. My point was only that Ramachandran gives us a neurological basis for the inflexibility of the old guard even if they are being entirely sincere. 

And I&#039;m glad you agree with the central point!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Student &#8211; in fairness to Trivers, I linked to his collection of papers in which he collated all his work organised by theme. I&#8217;m sure he has made his point more briefly in earlier works!</p>
<p>You&#8217;re right. I thought of mentioning Ramachandran&#8217;s critique of Trivers but decided against it because I wasn&#8217;t leaning on a strict interpretation of Trivers&#8217; conclusion. As Ramachandran mentions, self-deception has maladaptive consequences. But its not clear to me that the true believer banker is engaging in true self-deception given that he benefits in the short run. As I see it, the conclusion is more relevant for the knowing deceiver who has an uphill task competing with a true believer. </p>
<p>But yes &#8211; I think Ramachandran&#8217;s paper especially is fascinating reading and very well-written and accessible. </p>
<p>On Kuhn again you&#8217;re right. My point was only that Ramachandran gives us a neurological basis for the inflexibility of the old guard even if they are being entirely sincere. </p>
<p>And I&#8217;m glad you agree with the central point!</p>
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		<title>By: Jed Harris</title>
		<link>http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/02/17/natural-selection-self-deception-and-moral-hazard/comment-page-1/#comment-286</link>
		<dc:creator>Jed Harris</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 20 Feb 2010 04:08:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=231#comment-286</guid>
		<description>Your points are excellent.  They have a broad implication.  

If people have &lt;em&gt;any&lt;/em&gt; systematic deviations from rationality, the economic system will evolve to exploit those deficits until stopped by breakdown or regulation.  

So for example credit card and rental car insurance exploit risk aversion, pay day loans exploit hyperbolic discounting, etc.  

Markets adapt to amplify irrationality.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Your points are excellent.  They have a broad implication.  </p>
<p>If people have <em>any</em> systematic deviations from rationality, the economic system will evolve to exploit those deficits until stopped by breakdown or regulation.  </p>
<p>So for example credit card and rental car insurance exploit risk aversion, pay day loans exploit hyperbolic discounting, etc.  </p>
<p>Markets adapt to amplify irrationality.</p>
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		<title>By: student</title>
		<link>http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/02/17/natural-selection-self-deception-and-moral-hazard/comment-page-1/#comment-285</link>
		<dc:creator>student</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 20 Feb 2010 03:34:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=231#comment-285</guid>
		<description>I clicked though to your linked refs; fascinating reading.  Although I swear Trivers was getting paid by the word; he takes forever to get to the point.

However, in quoting Trivers via Ramachandran you really might mention that Ramachandran thinks Trivers is, if not wrong, not entirely right, either.

Moreover, claiming Ramachandran provides a neurological explanation for Kuhnian paradigm shifts is over the edge.  In the first place, I spent about three years of my life studying those issues, coming to the conclusion that, on the whole, the less said about Kuhnian paradigm shifts the better.  More directly, Ramachandran&#039;s work would lead one to believe that after a certain point scientists should shift paradigms.  In fact, as Kuhn documents, what happens is that the new paradigm wins when believers in the old one die off.  It&#039;s the young, who have less invested in the old way, who make the shift.  See &quot;Night Thoughts of a Classical Physicist.&quot; 

I should add that I agree with your main point; several lines of argument show that the assumption of deliberate exploitation of the value of the implicit government guarantee is not necessary to explain that guarantee&#039;s role in the mess.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I clicked though to your linked refs; fascinating reading.  Although I swear Trivers was getting paid by the word; he takes forever to get to the point.</p>
<p>However, in quoting Trivers via Ramachandran you really might mention that Ramachandran thinks Trivers is, if not wrong, not entirely right, either.</p>
<p>Moreover, claiming Ramachandran provides a neurological explanation for Kuhnian paradigm shifts is over the edge.  In the first place, I spent about three years of my life studying those issues, coming to the conclusion that, on the whole, the less said about Kuhnian paradigm shifts the better.  More directly, Ramachandran&#8217;s work would lead one to believe that after a certain point scientists should shift paradigms.  In fact, as Kuhn documents, what happens is that the new paradigm wins when believers in the old one die off.  It&#8217;s the young, who have less invested in the old way, who make the shift.  See &#8220;Night Thoughts of a Classical Physicist.&#8221; </p>
<p>I should add that I agree with your main point; several lines of argument show that the assumption of deliberate exploitation of the value of the implicit government guarantee is not necessary to explain that guarantee&#8217;s role in the mess.</p>
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		<title>By: Ken Houghton</title>
		<link>http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/02/17/natural-selection-self-deception-and-moral-hazard/comment-page-1/#comment-273</link>
		<dc:creator>Ken Houghton</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2010 14:23:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=231#comment-273</guid>
		<description>And Jeffrey Friedman has this to say about the actions of Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin...&quot;If Tannin and Cioffi were guilty of anything, it was the mistake of believing the triple-A ratings.”

(Adds Jeffrey Friedman to list of people who should never be allowed to write about finance again, except with the small Crayola box.)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>And Jeffrey Friedman has this to say about the actions of Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin&#8230;&#8221;If Tannin and Cioffi were guilty of anything, it was the mistake of believing the triple-A ratings.”</p>
<p>(Adds Jeffrey Friedman to list of people who should never be allowed to write about finance again, except with the small Crayola box.)</p>
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		<title>By: admin</title>
		<link>http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/02/17/natural-selection-self-deception-and-moral-hazard/comment-page-1/#comment-267</link>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2010 06:24:47 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Thanks Michael - your idea in the linked post of better disclosure mitigating the principal-agent problem is valid. At the very least, we need to enforce strict mark-to-market in as many cases as we can - a point I have argued in an earlier post.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks Michael &#8211; your idea in the linked post of better disclosure mitigating the principal-agent problem is valid. At the very least, we need to enforce strict mark-to-market in as many cases as we can &#8211; a point I have argued in an earlier post.</p>
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		<title>By: admin</title>
		<link>http://www.macroresilience.com/2010/02/17/natural-selection-self-deception-and-moral-hazard/comment-page-1/#comment-266</link>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2010 06:21:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.macroresilience.com/?p=231#comment-266</guid>
		<description>Thanks David - I hadn&#039;t heard that acronym either! But it does ring true. Shifting potential losses into the future is a popular strategy for many agents, not least politicians - Greece probably being the best example.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks David &#8211; I hadn&#8217;t heard that acronym either! But it does ring true. Shifting potential losses into the future is a popular strategy for many agents, not least politicians &#8211; Greece probably being the best example.</p>
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